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The Supreme Court of Missouri has recently held that two
attorneys should be disbarred, when, after the trial of a cause
in which they were engaged, one of them falsified
Attorneys,
Disbarment,, the transcript of evidence furnished by the official
Alteration of

stenographer, by removing therefrom the cQrrectly

Record

transcribed testimony of material witnesses, and
substituiting false statements that had not been testified to, and
delivered the mutilated transcript to the judge as correct, m.isleading him into signing and approving the same; and the
other, knowing such transcript to be false, prepared upon it an
abstract, brief, and printed argument, with intent to deceive
the appellate court, and get a reversal .of the judgment against
his client: State v, Harber, 31 S. XV. Rep. 889. • It was also
held that such proceedings might be properly instituted in the
supreme court, on relation of the attorney general. But in
State v. HdiUs, 31 S. W. Rep. 744, a case growing out of the
same transaction, it was held that the senior counsel, who was
not shown to have had any connection with the mutilation of
the record, would not be disbarred from arguing the appeal
from the record as filed.
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The Circuit Court for the District of South Carolina has
declared the registration' laws of that state null and void,
67 Fed. Rep. 818,
Constitutional holding, in Mills v. Green,
(i.) That a suit brought by a citizen of the United
LLw,
Suit against States against the supervisor of registration of a
State,
Registration
Laws

state, charged, under the state statutes, with the

duty of superintending the registration of voters,

to restrain him from carrying out the provisions of such
statutes, on the ground that they violate the constitution of
the United States, is not a suit against the state; (2.) That the
leading purpose in the adoption of the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments to the constitution of the United States was to
secure to persons of African descent the full enjoyment of the
privileges of citizenship, including the right to vote; and the
courts of the United States have jurisdiction of a suit by such
a person against officers of a state to restrain them from acting
upder a statute of that state, claimed to violate the said
amendments to the constitution by abridging or denying such
privileges; and (3.) That the statutes of South Carolina relating
to the registration of voters, one of which, passed in 1882,
(Gen. Stat. 1882, § 9 o ,&c.,) provided that in 1882 a registration of voters should b made, and the registration books
closed; that thereafter such -books should be open once a
month after the general election in each year, until the first of
July preceding each general election, (usually held in November,) for the registration of persons thereafter becoming
entitled to vote; that. after the closing of the books in each
year, persons coming of age before the election might be
registered; and that, upon the registration of any voter, a certificate of registration should be given him, without the production of which he should not be allowed to vote, and which,
upon removal from one county to another, must be transferred and renewed under onerous conditions; the other of
which statutes, passed in 1894, providing for the election of members of a constitutional convention, also provided that a person
not registered in 1882, or at a subsequent time when he would
have a right to register, might register within a certain time,
upon making affidavit, supported by that of two respectable
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citizens, as to various particulars of his occupation and residence at the time he might have registered and thereafter;that these statutes were an unreasonable restriction of the
right of suffrage, -manifestly designed to prevent the exercise
of that right by ignorant persons, especially -of the African
race, and were a violation both of the constitution of the
state and of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the
constitution of the United States.
When, in proceedings for contempt in inciting and causing
the publicatioti of a criticism of a judge's official action, it
appears that the defendant had no agency in the
Contempt

publication, nor knowledge of it, a commitment for

contempt is void for want of jurisdiction: Ex parte Taylor,
(Court of Crimindl Appeals of Texas,) 31 S.W. Rep. 64i.
The Supreme Court of Illinois has at last wiped :out the
Whisky Trust, holding, in Distilling & Catile-Feding Co:. v.
People, 41 N. E. Rep. .8o, (i.) That a-trust combiContracts,
Restraint of nation, organized in order to obtain control of the
Trade,
manufacture and sale of. distillery products, by
T r us t s
b u
n
..
up. - the
stock of various distillery. -combuying
panies, and placing, it in the hands of trustees, is illegal,
because it creates a monopoly; (2.) That when such a-trust
combination is changed into a corporation, organized, owned
and controlled by the trustees of the combination, and all the
property controlled by the corporation is transferred to the
corporation, the latter is also illegal; and (3.) That a corpora-,
tion authorized by- its charter to engage in the general distilling
business in the state of its creation and elsewhere, and to own
the property necessary for that purpose, has no right to buy
up practically all the distillers in the country, so as to acquire
a virtual monopoly of the business.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey has recently held, that
when the power to condemn lands, confered upon'a corporation by the act by which it is created, is restricted
Corporations,
by a proviso that it shall in no case be authorized
Eminent
Domain,
to condemn and take possession of the land or
Restriction
property of any other corporation existing under
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the laws of the state, (i.) This restriction is not confined to
lands of corporations existing at the passage of the act, but
applies to those thereafter incorporated; and (2.) Another
corporation, which acquires lands after the first corporation
had filed a survey thereof according to the requirements of the
laws, but before any petition for the appointment of commissioners had been presented, may claim exemption from condemnation under the proviso: In re American Transp. &
aNav. Co., 32 Atl. Rep. 74.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Indiana, in Tlornbmg v. American Straw-Board Co., 40 N.
E. Rep. io62, a man who marries the mother of a
Death by
bastard child, and receives the child into his home
Wrongful
as a member of his family, has no right of action
Act,
Parent and
Child,
Bastard

for its death, under a statute, (Rev. Stat. Ind.
1894, § 267,) which provides that a father may
sue for the injury or death of a child.
As a general rule, the mother of an illegitimate child cannot recover damages for his death under the statutes giving
a right of action to the relatives or representatives of any
one killed through the negligence of another: Gibson v.
.3fidlandRy. Co., 2 Ont. 658; Harkins v. P. & R. R. R.
Co., I5 Phila., (Pa.) 286; S. C., i i V. N. C. 120. So,
under the Missouri statute, (Rev. Stat. Mo. 1889, § 4425,)
giving a right of action to recover damages for the death
of any one from an injury resulting from or occasioned
by negligence, unskilfulness. or criminal intent, and providing
that if the deceased be a minor and unmarried, whether such
deceased unmarried minor be a natural-born or adopted child,
then the father and mother may join in the suit, and each
shall have an equal interest in the judgment, it was held by
the Circuit Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western
District, that the interest so given extended only to the case
of natural-born legitimate children, and that no action could
be maintained by a mother for the death of her bastard child:
Vabasl R. R. Co., 46 Fed. Rep. 269; but the
Jfarshall v. W,
Court
of Missouri, Division No. i, in lMarshall v.
Supreme
Wabash R. R. Co., (Mo.) 25 S.V. Rep. 179, held, that under
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this same statute the mother could sue for the wrongful killing
of her bastard child, when a minor and unmarried, and that
without joining the father of the child as a plaintiff. This
decision is rested expressly on the ground that by the statutes
of Missouri the want of inheritable blood is removed, on the
mothez-'s side; and this incapacity being removed so far as she
is concerned, there seems to be no good reason why a statute
which speaks of parents and children should not apply to a
mother and her illegitimate child, unless there is something to
show that that application was not intended.
Although the Supreme Court of South Carolina, as at
present constituted, is unreliable on questions of purely local
interest, such as the Dispensary and Registration
conflict of laws, it nevertheless displays a great deal of
Laws
acumen on matters of general jurisprudence. It
is almost the only court that has refused to be misled by the
specious arguments and daring assumptions of the would-be
authorities who would have us believe that the marriage state
is an eleventh .incorporeal hereditament, which escaped the
argus eyes of Mr. Blackstone, to be discovered by the microsccpic search of Messrs. Bishop, Black and Freeman, who,
like the Athenians, are always eager to hear, or to tell,
some new thing, as becomes the writers of successful books.
In J7cCreery v. Davis, 22 S. E. Rep. 178, the court aforesaid, in a long and able opinion by Judge POPE, discusses
the whole question, and arrives at these conclusions; (.) That
marriage is a civil contract, and not a rcs or statuis; (2.) That
the common law doctrine of divorce prevails in South Carolina;
and (3.) That when a citizen of South Carolina, married in
New York to a citizen of that state, resided with his wife in
South Carolina, until she left him and went to Illinois, where
she obtained a divorce according to the laws of Illinois, without
personal service on or appearance of her husband, on a ground
of divorce not recognized as cause for divorce in New York or
South Carolina, the Illinois judgment is void in South Carolina ; for Art. IV, § i, of the United States constitution, which
provides that full faith and credit shall be given in each state
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to the judicial proceedings of every other state, and the act of
Congress, (i

Rev. Stat. U. S. § 905,) which provides that

records and proceedings thereof, properly authenticated, shall
have such faith and credit given them in every court of the
United States as they have in the state whence they may be
taken, do not prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the
court which renders the judgment.
We may be pardoned for quoting a portion of the argument
by which Judge POPE assails, and shatters, the position of those
who would hold that marriage creates a status between the
parties, which, like greenbacks, may be converted into a res for
the purposes of social economy. " Is it not an assumption
coined in order to give a plausible basis to the solution of an
otherwise untenable position? Is it not bythis means that they
hope to give currency to an otherwise baffled policy, namely,
to so construct a plan that thereby they may successfully
invoke that portion of the federal constitution relating to the
effect to be given by all the states to the acts and judgments of
one state, and thus force all other states to give effect to judgments for absolute divorces? If marriage were still esteemed
a civil contract, they could not hope to escape the defect of jurisdiction hereafter discussed. But by coining this new term
'status,' and ascribing the efficacy of 'res' to it, under
certain principles hereafter to be referred to, it is deemed by
them that the difficulty has been overcome." In short, there
is no legal authority for making the condition of marriage a
"status," or for investing that condition with the properties of
an incorporeal hereditament, which a "res" must be, if it is
anything not tangible; but such is an assumption pure and
simple, designed for the easy gratification of the lust of the
flesh, and the emolument of those courts which serve other
states in the matter of divorce as in marriage affairs Camden
once served Pennsylvania, and Gretna Green England. That
is, it is an utterly illegal assumption, without a shadow of
excuse, except that of the evil it produces. This is also
the law of New York, where it is held that the marriage
relation is not a res within the state of the party invoking
the jurisdiction of a court to dissolve it, so as to authorize
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the court to bind an absent party, a citizen of another
state, by substituted service or actual notice given without
the jurisdiction of the court where the action is pending;
and that therefore a judgment of divorce rendered in another
state against a resident of New York, when there has been
no personal service of process within the state rendering it,
and no personal appearance by the defendant in the action,
is void in New York: Williams v. Williams, 13o N. Y. 193;
S. C., 29 N. E. Rep. 98; DaVis v. Davis, 22 N. Y. Suppl.
191 ; S. C., 2 Misc. Rep. 549; and in Pennsylvania, where
the same rule obtains: Lewis v. Lewis, 6 Kulp (Pa.) 429;
Commonwealth v. Steiger, I2 Pa. C. C. 334; S. C., 2 D. R.
(Pa.) 493 i Commonwealth v. Shuler, 2 D. R. (Pa.) 552. It is
still the rule in England : Green v. Green, [1893] Prob. 89.

In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Nebraska, a mortgage given to secure a debt will not be set aside as procured
by duress, on the ground that it was given to
Duress,
Mortgage
obtain a dismissal of criminal proceedings instituted by the creditor against the mortgagor, when the mortgage was given without threats or promises having been made
to the mortgagor, and after a statement by the creditor's agent
that no promise could be made, but, on the contrary, that the
prosecution would have to take its course: Hargreaves v.
Mfeiken, 63 N. W. Rep. 95 1. See i AMx. L. REG. & REV.
(N. S.) 885.

In Hanscom v. State, 31 S.W. Rep. 547, the Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas has been called upon to pass upon some of
Elections,
Ballots,

Validity

the apparently endless series of disputes as to the

validity of ballots under the Australian Ballot
Laws. The Revised Statutes of that state, Art.

1694, provide that "All ballots shall be written or printed on
plain white paper, without any picture, sign, vignette, device
or stamp mark, except the writing or printing in black ink or
black pencil of the names of the candidates and the several
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offices to be filled, and except the name of the political party
whose candidates are on the ticket;" and this was held not to
require the rejection of a ballot on which the voter has written
his name, nor one on which the election officers have indorsed
their initials, nor those on which the names of candidates not
voted for are stricken out with a pencil, or on which certain
letters or figures are written, or on which the same number is
written twice.
The act of Texas of April 12, 1892, p. IS, §§ 26 & 27,
provides as follows: "Sec. 26. Not more than one person
shall at one time be permitted to occupy any one
Assisting
Voters
compartment or place provided for electors to
prepare their ballots, except when an elector is unable to
prepare his ballot he may [be] accompanied by the two judges
to as-iist him, and no person shall remain in or occupy such
conpartment longer than may be necessary to prepare his
ballot.
Sec. 27. Any elector who declares to the presiding officer
that he cannot read or write, or that by blindness or other
physical disability he is unable to prepare his ballot, shall upon
request receive the assistance of two of the judges in the
preparation thereof."
Under these sections it was held, in the case cited above,
(I.) That the fact that such voters are assisted in preparing
their ballots by one judge only is no ground for rejecting the
ballots, in the absence of fraud, as the statute does not
provide for their reiection : (2.) That the fact that a jutdge of
election, who, before his appointment, received money from a
candidate, and advocated his cause at the polls, prepared the
ballot for a voter in the interest of that candidate, does not
invalidate it; and (3.) That when a voter who can read,
intending to vote for one person, directs a judge of election
to prepare a ballot according to a "guide " given to the judge
by the voter, the fact that the vote is afterwards found to be
for another will not cause its rejection for fraud, if it does not
appear whether it was due to the design of the judge, or to a
mistake in the "guide."
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According to the Supreme Court of Missouri, the grant to
an illuminating company of the right to make and distribute
be
ElectricLight, gas, and any substance that might thereafter
Substitution used as a substitute therefor, and to lay down any
for Gas
fixtures required therefor, having been made when
electric'lighting was unknown, does not include the right to
adopt any method for distributing electricity for lighting, but
that right must be excrcised according to the regulations prescribed by law; and, when the power to regulate the use of
the streets has been delegated to a municipality before the
company adopted electricity for lighting purposes, it must
conform to the regulations prescribed by the municipal
authorities: State v. JAAhY,, 3 1 S. W. Rep. 594.

In a recent case in the Supreme Court of Alabama, Smith
v. Smith, 17 So. Rep. 68o, a mortgage had been given by a
partnership to the sureties on an administrator's
Equity,
bond, as security for a loan made by the adminisPleading,
Multifarious- trator to the firm, and also for the benefit of the
ness

heirs. A bill to foreclose the said mortgage, in
which the heirs were complainants, and the administrator and
his sureties, the firm, the attaching creditors of the firm, and
the sheriff, were respondents, alleged that the creditors, proceeding separately, attached the mortgaged property; that
part thereof was sold by the sheriff, and the proceeds appropriated by the creditors; and that the sheriff sold a mortgaged
lot, and gave a conveyance thereof. The bill prayed for
foreclosure, that the administrator account, that the administration be removed into the chancery court, and that the
sheriff's deed be canceled. This was held not to be multi,farious, nor bad on account of a misjoinder of parties defendant.
The Circuit Court for the District of West Virginia has also
lately ruled, in U/man v. Jaeger,67' Fed. Rep. 980, that in a
bill and cross-bill for partition between tenants in common of
a tract of land, it is proper to join as defendants numerous
purchasers of a part of the land at a tax sale, for the purpose
of canceling their deeds, on the ground that the tax proceed-

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

ings were invalid, and such a joinder will not render the bills
multifarious.
Wires and insulators, used in forming and completing the
connection between an electric light and power plant and the
Fixtures,
Electric
Wires

dwellings, stores and other public places supplied

by that plant, for the purpose of conveying or
transmitting light and heat thereto, are fixtures,

within the provisions of the mechanic's lien law: Hughes v.
Lambertville Electric Light, Heat & Power Co., (Court of Chancery of New Jersey,) 32 Atl. Rep. 69.
To the same effect is Badger Lumber Co. v. Marion Water
Supply, Electric Light & Power Co., 48 Kans. 182; S. C.,

29

Pac. Rep. 476; and the same is true of the pipes used by a
corporation to convey vapor used for cold storage from its
plant to its customers: Steger v. Arctic Refrigerating Co.,
(Tenn.) i4 S. W. Rep. IO87. See 2 AM. L. REG. & REv.
(N. S.), 431.

_

In Beardv. United States, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 962, the Supreme
Court of the United States has reasserted a very salutary prinHomicide,

Self-Defense,
Duty
to Retreat

ciple of the law of homicide which some courts

occasionally seem to forget, viz.: That if the
accused does not provoke an assault, and at the

time has reasonable ground to believe, and does
believe, that his assailant intends to take his life, or to do him
great bodily harm, he is not obliged to retreat, nor consider
whether he can safely retreat, but is entitled to stand his
ground, and meet any attack made upon him with a deadly
weapon, in such a way and with such force as, under all the
circumstances, he at the moment honestly believes, and has
reasonable grounds to believe, is necessary to save his own
life, or to protect himself from great bodily injury.
To substantially the same effect is Page v. State, (Supreme
Court of Indiana,) 40 N. E. Rep. 745.

The Queen's Bench Division of England has recently decided,.
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that when a commercial traveler, who traveled for the plaintiffs,
went in the course of their business to stay at a
Innkeeper,
Lien,
certain inn, and while there received certain parcels
Ooodsof Third of goods, sent him by the plaintiffs for sale in the
Commercial
Traveler

district, the innkeeper had a lien on the goods, on
the failure of the traveler to pay for his board and

lodging in the inn, although at the time they were received he
knew them to be the goods of the plaintiff, and not of the
traveler: Robins & Co. v. Gray, [1895] 2 Q. B. 78.
The question of knowledge was held to be immaterial in
this case, because "the goods in question were of a kind which
a. commercial traveler would in the ordinary course carry
about with him to the inns at which he put up as part of the
regular apparatus of his calling, and which the innkeeper
would consequently be bound to receive into his inn and to
take care of while they were there. Here it is true that the
goods were not brought by Green to the inn-they were sent
to him while he was staying there. But that can make no
difference. The defendant was bound to receive them and take
care of them as a part -of his duty towards his guest. It follows that the lien attached to them."
The Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, has lately
held, in The London Assurance v. Companhia de .foagens do
Insurance, Barreiro, 68 Fed. Rep. 247, affirming 56 Fed.
Marine,
Rep. 44, (I.) That an exception in the words,
Collision
"Free of particular average unless the vessel be
sunk, burned, stranded, or in collision," ceases to operate as
soon as a collision has occurred; and the insurer is liable for
subsequent loss, whether the same resulted from the collision
or not; and (2.) That there is a "collision," within the meaning of the above exception, when the vessel, after being completely loaded and casting off her moorings, is made fast again
to the wharf, because of a difficulty with her engines, and is
there run into by a scow, in tow of a tug-boat,.which made a
substantial break in her bulwarks.
The legislature of South Carolina has received another setback at the hands of the Circuit Court for that district, which
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has recently declared the notorious Dispensary
Law of that state, which prohibits citizens of the
state from bringing into it, for their own use,

Law

alcoholic liquors purchased in other states, and
directs the seizure and confiscation of such liquors, but
provides for the purchase of such liquors, either in or out of
the state, by state officials, and for their sale by such officials,
to be unconstitutional, holding, in Donald v. Scott, 67 Fed.
Rep. 854, where a citizen of South Carolina had purchased in
other states, and imported, for his own use, certain alcoholic
liquors, which were seized by the state constables, acting
under the dispensary law; and then filed a bill in the federal
court for an injunction to restrain the constables from continuing their interference with his importation of alcoholic
liquors, alleging that the dispensary law was an interference
with interstate commerce, and in contravention of the acts of
congress relating thereto, (I.) That such a suit is not a suit
against the state; (2.) That the suit involved a federal question,
and was within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States; (3.) That so far as the dispensary law prohibited
citizens of the state from purchasing alcoholic liquors, for their
own use, in other states, and importing them into the state, it
was a discrimination against the products of other states and
the citizens of such states not patronized by the state officials
of South Carolina, and was void as an interference with interstate commerce : and (4.) That it could not be justified as an
exercise of the police power.
It is libelous to falsely publish of one that he " would be an
anarchist if he thought it would pay," when explained by
innuendoes to mean that plaintiff, for a money
Mibe!,
consideration, would engage in the unlawful,
"Anarchist,"
treasonable and felonious designs of anarchists,
Innuendoes
and that an anarchist is a person who, actuated by mere lust
of plunder, seeks to overturn by violence all constittited forms
and institutions of society and law and order, and all rights of
property : Lewis v. Daily Mews Co. of Cumberland, (Court of
Appeals of Maryland,) 32 Atl. Rep. 246.

'O

PkoGkEgSE _ t 1THIE LAWS

"

497,;

A~dordikg" t' a ;"r'cntdedision' of tlie sanie' court; in Ian,,
a tib'

for,
r'm ahilclifs 'pt6se6lti6'n,,(i.) It' is ' pfop'er t6' refise'

P~o:e.u Yii%,"
Disissal of

toiper6fit'cttie ' fdrenian"of 'th&" grand 'jury; wh6!against-'
that- th. -crirhiinalprosedutibn
ha's tekstifed'
it.
,as
.t,,

Pros'ecutro'%" the' plaintiff was' dismis~ed,
by Dn'aehdhnii'dismissed, !as his' testimony

to state why "it:'
wAas
merely. proves- that

the"'prosecttion "is at'an' end, and has -'nd' bearihk '.on,th
qUstidlnf"pi-obbe cause; and'(2.) Tfiat' evidece'thhttle'
crimiiil priosecutfin' wAs' diSImisSed at 'the instai e"'of !th
def&ndant, witiout" ttie plaintiff' kndiedge; is! ir evdnt
eitlh r 'Irbar of'tlie suit, of's ii niti'gati'on' of'dmges : 'Ow'e7ns
V OsL'ehz, 32 AtL Rep. 247,

n' Gf

a

v

sA, [8

93

] J2 '

B[ 84,: the Court of.

Mzste iand

iand' hais reversed tha'j tidgment of"th ,Qdeen's
Bench Dinisii , '[I89 '5] '['Q. B.' 557.- [Se'2 Ai.'
f. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 288.],' In 1that case; whiloe

Et-Oloyment'

ti6 defehidants' omihibU was being driven, by_their.

Appe'al;' f
Se r~itn'

o0Sub'stitui&
b. Servant,
Agent

.ce.. , th n,"

..

'

seivant, a pohceman,thnkig the'driver was'drurik
ordered him tO di~contibue driving. The' omnibus
was then only a quarter' of a mile from"
the, de;

fzndan'6' yard; and the driver and the conductor' authorized,
a person Who WVas standing by to drive the omnibus hbme.
That p&son, through his negligence in ' diiving,, injured the
plaintirff; b ut it was leld that, as the defendl nts mighthave
been -communicated with', there was no' necessity f6r their
servants td' employ another person to' driv'e the omnibus hom'e,
and th6 defendants w're not liable for the'negligence' of'the
person so empl6'yed. It whs also queried whether, if there
ha'd !ben su'&h'a'necessity, th'e defendants would' have been-

liable.

Q. B. 1; recentl 'decided !byth'e
IniRobb V. Gr-een, [ 9
Queen's Bench Division of' England, the defendant; while
l....r' e*poyed b. the plaintff as manager' of' h]is b'siUse or' Infor. n6ss, sec'retlv copied from hi sm'aster's 'orderLbool
obtaind 'dur- a list of the names and 'addresses of his customers,'
f6r' the purpose of'
hith
'tie intention' of using it!
ing'Service,
Lia6ifity

solcifing orders frni them after' he had' left the
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plaintiff's service and set up business on his own account.
Subsequently, his service with the plaintiff having terminated,
he did so use the list; and it was held, on trial without a jury,
that it was an implied condition of the contract of service that
the defendant would not use, to the detriment of the plaintiff,
information to which he had access in the course of the
service, and that the defendant was therefore liable in damages
for any loss caused to the plaintiff by reason of the breach of
that condition.
In 1'fer),'wcather v. Jfoore, [1892] 2 Ch. 5 18, the defendant, upon completing a term of apprenticeship with the plaintiffs, a firm of engine-makers, was retained in their employment
as a paid clerk, but subsequently left their service for that of
another firm of engine-makers. Two days before leaving the
plaintiffs' service he compiled for his own purposes, and without their consent, a table of dimensions of various types of
engines made by them, and had this table in his possession
when he entered the service of his new employers, who subsequently exposed for sale an engine which, it was affirmed on
one side and denied on the other, was of dimensions corresponding to dimensions given in the table. On motion for an
injunction to restrain the defendant from publishing or communicating the table or its contents to any one, it was held
that, in compiling and retaining the table for his own purposes,
the defendant had committed an abuse of the confidence ordinarily existing between a clerk and his employer, or a breach
of the implied contract arising from that confidence, which is,
that a servant shall not use, except for the purposes of service,
the opportunities which that service gives him of gaining
information; and that the injunction should be granted. And
in Lamb v. Evans, [18 9 3 ] I Ch. 218, canvassers, who had
been employed by the publisher of a directory, under an agreement which bound them to devote themselves in a particular
district exclusively to obtaining from traders advertisements to
be inserted in the directory, and to supply the blocks and
materials necessary for producing such advertisements, proposed, at the expiration of their agreements, to assist a rival
publication in procuring similar advertisements; and it was
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held oy the Court of Appeal that they were not entitled to use
for the purposes of any other publication the materials which,
while in the plaintiff's employment, they had obtained for the
purpose of his publication.
When the employe has entered into an agreement, prior to
entering the service, not to divulge or use any secrets of the
business the employer might make known to him, but subsequently leaves the plaintiff's employ and begins the manufacture of similar goods, using the plaintiff's secret processes, he
wil . be restrained from so doing by injunction: Eralic/i v.
Despar, I65 Pa. 24; S. C., 3o Atl. Rep. 521; Peabodj,v.
Noifolk, 98 Mass. 452; Salomon v. Hcrt, 40 N. J. Eq. 400;
S. C., 2 Atl. Rep. 379.
In State v. fito-, 31 S. NV. Rep. 781, the Supreme Court
of Missouri, Division No. 2, has lately rendered a very interProhibition esting and valuable decision on one of the most
of iember-

important questions of the day,-that of the right

ship in

Labor Unions of an employer to prohibit his employes from

becoming or remaining members of labor unions.
This right exists at common law, as was ably demonstrated by
:Judge DALLAS, of the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, in Platt v. Pi/a.& R]?ading-R. R. Co., 65 Fed.
Rep. 66o; but it has been abrogated by statute in several
states. In Missouri, the act of March 6, 1893, P. L. 187, § I,
enter into any
.shall
provides that "no employer .......
to withdraw
employe
such
any
with
agreement
or
contract
fiom any trade union, labor union or other lawful organization
of which said employe may be a member, or requiring said
employe to refrain from joining any trade union, labor union,
or other lawful organization, or requiring any such employe
to abstain from attending any meeting or assemblage of people
called or held for lawful purposes, or shall by any means
attempt to compel or coerce any employe into withdrawal firom
any lawful organization or society;" and § 3 makes a violation
of the act punishable by fine and imprisonment. This, in the
case mentioned above, was held to be unconstitutional, (i.)
Because it is in contravention of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, and Art. 2, § 30, of the
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Constitution of Missouri, providing that no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; (2.) Because it is in violation of section i of the Fourteenth Amendment, providing that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
and (3.) Because it is special legislation, forbidden by art. 4,
§ 53, of the Missouri Constitution, in that "it does not relate
to persons or things as a class,-to all workingmen, &c.,-but only to those who belong to some ' lawful organization or
society,' evidently referring to a trade union, &c." The court
further goes on to declare that the statute cannot be upheld
on the assumption that it is a police regulation. "It has none
of the elements or attributes which pertain to such z regulation, for it does not, in terms or by implication, promote or
tend to promote the public health, welfare, comfort, or safety;
and if it did, the state would not be allowed, under the guise
and pretense of a police regulation, to encroach or trample
upon any of the just rights of the citizen, which the constitution intended to secure against diminution or abridgment."
Similar statutes have been passed in other states. In California, it is enacted by the act of March 14, 1893, c. 149,
P. L. 176, (Penal Code Cal. § 679,) that " any person or corporation within this state, or agent or officer on behalf of such
person or corporation, who shall hereafter coerce or compel any
person or persons to enter into an agreement, either written or
verbal, not to join or become a member of any labor organization,
as a condition of such person or persons securing employment
or continuing in the employment of any such person or corporation, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor." The act of Idaho of
March 6, 1893, P. L. 152, provides that "it shall be un!awful
for any person, firm or corporation, to make or enter into any
agreement, either oral or in writing, by the terms of which any
employe of such person, firm or corporation, or any person
about to enter the employ of such person. firm or corporation,
as a condition for continuing or obtaining such employment,
shall promise or agree not to become or continue a member of
a labor organization; " and makes a violation of the act a mis-

demeanor, punishable by fine and imprisonment.

The act of
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Illinois of June 17, 1893, P. L. 98, enacts that "it shall be
.unlawful for any individual or member of any firm, or agent,
officer or employe of any company or corporation, to prevent,
or "attempt to prevent, employes from forming, joining and
belonging to any lawful labor organization, and any such individual, member, agent, officer, or employe that coerces or
attempts to coerce employes by discharging or threatening to
discharge [them] from their employ or the employ of any firm,
company, or corporation, because of their connection with such
lawful labor organization, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,"
punishable by fine and imprisonment. By the act of Massachusetts of May 3 1, 1892, it is provided that "any person or
corporation, or agent or officer on behalf of such person or
corporation, who shall hereafter coerce or compel any person
or persons to enter into an agreement, either written or verbal,
not to join or become a member of any labor organization, as
a condition of such person or persons securing employment or
continuing in the employment of any such person or corporation, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred
dollars." And the act of Ohio of April 14, 1892, P. L. 269,
is exactly the same as the Illinois statute quoted above, word
for word, the latter being evidently a transcript of the former.
This Ohio act was held constitutional in Davis v. State, 30
Wkly. Law Bull. 342, because the court did not see its way
clear to hold it unconstitutional ; but all such acts, accordingto the Missouri case cited above, are unconstitutional.

According to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, a stockholder in a corporation, whose votes have been improperly
4QuoWarranto,

rejected at a corporate election, is a proper party

Corporations, to institute proceedings of quo warrazto against
Parties
officers who claim to have been elected at that

election, although, at the same election, he also was elected to
an office, his title to which is undisputed : Commonw'eal/t v.
Stevens, 32 Atl. Rep. i i I.
The Exchequer

Division of Ireland, in Boyd v. Great

;C2
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Northern Ry. Co., [1895] 2 Ir. R. 555, has recently decided,
that when a person, (in this case a physician,)
Railroads,
Blocking of whose time is of pecuniary value, is, while driving
Crossings,
Damages for
Loss of Time

along a public highway, detained for twenty minutes at a level crossing by the unreasonable and

negligent delay of the employes of a railroad company in opening the gates at the crossing, the company will be liable in
damages for the delay to the person so detained.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey, in Barber
v. IVest jersey Title & Guarantee"CO., 32 AtI. Rep. 222, has
Records,
Access,
.Abstractor of
Titles,

.AMandamus

reversed the decree of the Court of Chancery,
(49 N. J. Eq. 474; S. C., 24 Atl. Rep. 38,)
holding, in opposition to the latter court, (i.) That
while every person has the right of access to the

public records of the county clerk's office, without the
payment of any fees to the clerk, to examine any title in
which he is interested, subject to reasonable rules and regulations, and a title insurance company has the same right of
access to the records when employed to examine and
guarantee the title to a particular piece of property, yet such
a company has no right to occupy the clerk's office for the
purpose of making an abstract of the records, in order to set
up and establish a rival business to that of the clerk; and (2.)
That as the right of access is thus limited, mandamus to
enforce access, not injunction to prevent denial of access,. is
the proper remedy for a refusal to permit access to the records.
This decision is in decided conflict with the weight of
-authority: See 31 AM. L. REG. 769; 37 Cent. L. J. 395.
'The right of examining and abstracting the records, however,
must be exercised under suitable regulations. "This right
-does not permit the register to be unduly annoyed by a large
'force, or by work at unseasonable hours, or by the monopoly
-of furniture, office room, or records, to the exclusion of other
-persons, or with his right to prescribe a reasonable use of the
:same:" Day v. Button, 96 Mich. 6oo; S.C., 56 N.W. Rep. 3.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has lately held, in Funk
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v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 63 N. V. Rep. io99, that the provisions of Chapter 13 of the General Laws of MinneStreet
Railways, sota of i887, which enacts that every railroad
Fellowcorporation owning and operating a railroad in
Servants
that state shall be liable for damages sustained by an agent or
servant by reason of the negligence of any other agent or
servant, does not apply to a street-railway corporation, although
its line is operated by cable.
When a large amount of rock has been excavated at one
point in the course of a sewer, the extra cost of that excavation should not be assessed upon property situate
Sewers,
Assessment of between the rock and the outlet of the sewer,
since the removal of the rock- confers no benefit
Benefits
upon it: Vreeland v. Mayor, &c., of City of Bayonne,
(Supreme Court of New Jersey,) 32 Atl. Rep. 68.
Since the acts of a sheriff in seizing, upon a writ of attachment, property of the debtor which is exempt, and refusing to
deliver it on demand of the debtor, are, though
Sheriff,
unlawful, nevertheless done by him under color
Liability of
and by virtue of his office, they constitute a breach
Sureties
of the condition of his bond, and the sureties thereon are
liable: Hursey v. J3farty, (Supreme Court of Minnesota,)
63 N. W. Rep. io9o.
An agreement between two creditors of a common debtor
that each will share the loss, if any, which the other sustains
on his claim against the debtor, is a "promise to
Statute of
answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of
Frauds
another," within the statute of frauds: Spear v. Farmers'&
Mechanics' Bank, (Supreme Court of Illinois,) 41 N. E. Rep.
164, affirming 49 Ill. App. 5o9.
It seems to be the prevailing opinion in the United States,
that the mere signing of what purports to be an act of the
legislature by the presiding officers of the two
Statutes,
impeachment, houses thereof is of such mighty force and efficacy,
Fraud
as to completely abrogate all other constitutional
requirements as to the manner of its passage. One very glar-
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ing instance of this in cortice tendency was noticed in this
department last month, when a statute, which the journals
proved conclusively never to have passed, was held valid
nevertheless, because signed by the presiding officers of the
legislature : Carrv. Coke, (N. C.) 22 S. E. Rep. 16 ; Wyattv.
Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. (N. C.) 22 S. E. Rep. 120. [See
2 Am. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 441.]
Now the Supreme Court
of Indiana comes to the front with the astounding proposition,
that it is not admissible to prove from the journals that an act,
duly authenticated and signed by the governor, was in fact
passed by the legislature, and sent to him, within the two days
next preceding the final adjournment of the legislature, in
violation of Art. V, § 14, of the state constitution: Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Taggart, 40-N. E. Rep. 1050. What makes
this decision all the more remarkable is that it does not appear
that the signatures of the presiding officers authenticated any
other date, so as to make the act clearly valid on its face; and
the signature of the governor could not do this, as that was
dated within the two days. Therefore, if this decision be
correct, the constitutional provision is nugatory, unless the
presiding officers, or the governor, refuse to sign an act passed
within the time limited-a refusal of which they will never be
guilty, if they wish the act passed. And further, it is not to
be even suspected that the constitution intended the lodging
of such an arbitrary power in the hands of these persons. If
these North Carolina and Indiana decisions are correct, constitutional restrictions on the mode of passing statutes are a
mere blind, intended to amuse the people; and may be discarded with the greatest ease whenever desired. It is respectfully submitted, that wherever one party is overwhelmingly in
power, as in Pennsylvania or Texas, that the bills be simply
drawn up in committee, presented to the officers to sign, and
to the governor for approval. It will effect a vast saving of
time and trouble, and will in no wise invalidate the acts themselves. Of what use is a first, second or third reading, if the
want of it cannot be alleged to invalidate the act, when once
signed? No imaginary consequences of a step behind the
scenes can possibly have the evil consequences of a refusal to
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do so; and the legislative history of to-day shows clearly that
these latter evils are now growing with frightful rapidity. It
is the duty of the courts to check rather than foster them.
f
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court o
Louisiana, the importer of shooks or staves already bent so as
to form a barrel, of barrel heads ready for inserTaxation,
Exemption, tion, and of hoops ready to be driven, is not to be
Manufacturer deemed a manufacturer of a barrel, merely because

he substituted machinery for the usual hand labor of setting
up the staves in barrel shape, introducing the prepared headings, and driving on the hoops, first subjecting the staves and
other material to a heating process; and the machinery and
property thus employed are not exempt from taxation under
Article 207 of the constitution of that state: Brooklyn Cooperage Co. v. City of New Orleans, 17 So. Rep. 8o4.
One of the most hopeful signs in the present social crisis is
the general willingness of the courts to use the power of the
law to curb and punish the effrontery of the labor
Trade
Unions,
unions. One of the most important cases in this
Liability for
Procuring

regard that has come before the courts in late
of EI loye years, equally as important in its own sphere as
the Debs Case was in its province, has been
recently decided by the Court of Appeal of England. This is
the case of Flood v.Jackson, [1895] '2 Q. B. 2 1, in which the
broad principles, that an action will lie against a person who
maliciously induces a master to discharge a servant from his
employment, if injury ensues thereby to the servant,- even
though the discharge by the master does not constitute a
breach of the contract of employment, and that an action
will also lie for maliciously inducing a person to abstain
from entering into a contract to employ another, if injury
ensues to the latter thereby, were applied to members of a labor union who induced an employer to discharge certain of his employes. The plaintiffs were shipwrights, employed by the day, (and consequently liable to
discharge at the end of any day,) by a firm of ship repairers,
Dischargeeqal
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to execute repairs to the woodwork of a ship. Some ironworkers, who were members of a trade union, were employed
on the ironwork of the ship, and they objected to working in
the same yard with the plaintiffs, upon the ground that the
latter had previously worked at ironwork on ships in another
yard. The district delegate of the union was called in by the
ironworkers, and he informed the employers that all the ironworkers in the society would leave off work unless the plaintiffs were discharged that day, and that the ironworkers would
leave off work in any other yard in which the plaintiffs were
employed, adding that they were doing their best to stop the
practice of shipwrights being employed on ironwork. There
was also some evidence that the delegate did this to punish
the plaintiffs for their previous conduct in working upon iron.
In consequence of that threat the plaintiffs were discharged at
the end of the day. They then brought an action against the
district delegate, the chairman, and the general secretary of the
union, for maliciously, and with intent to injure the plaintiffs,
inducing the employers to discharge the plaintiffs, and to refuse
to engage them again. The jury found that the district delegate acted maliciously, and that the plaintiffs had been injured
thereby, but that the two other defendants did not authorize
his acts. It was accordingly held by the Court of Appeal,
(I.) That the action was maintainable against the district
delegate, although the discharge of the plaintiffs, and the refusal
to re-engage them, involved no breach of contract on the part
of the employers; but (2.) That the district delegate was not
the agent or servant of the members of the union, so as to
render each member liable for his acts, and that, therefore, the
chairman and general secretary were not, merely by reason of
their being members of the union, liable in the action.
It is well settled law that an action will lie on behalf of
either employer or employe against a third person who
maliciously induces the other party to break his contract,
either by persuading the employe to leave his employment, or
inducing the employer to discharge the employe, provided
that damage results from that breach: Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B.
D. 333 ; Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206 ; Walker v. Cronin,
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107 Mass. 555. This has been repeatedly applied to the case
of a strike or boycott urged against an employer, or a tradesman.' In Temperton v. Russell, [T893] i Q. B. 7T5, the
defendants were members of a joint committee of three trade
unions connected with the building trade in Hull. A firm of
builders there refused to obey certain rules laid down by the
unions with regard to building operations, and the unions
sought to compel them to do so by preventing the supply of
building materials to them. In pursuance of this object, they
requested the plaintiff, a master mason and builder in Hull,
who supplied building materials to the firm, to cease to supply
them with such materials, but he refused to comply. Thereupon, with the object of injuring the plaintiff in his business, in
order to compel him to comply with their request, the defendants induced persons who, to the knowledge of the defendants,
had entered into contracts with the plaintiff for the supply of
materials, to break their contracts, and not to enter into further
contracts with the plaintiff, by threatening that the workmen
would be withdrawn from their employ. The plaintiff sustained damages in consequence of such breaches of contract,
and of the refusal of such persons to enter into contracts
with him. The Court of Appeal held, that the right of
action for maliciously procuring a breach of contract, is
not confined to contracts in the nature of contracts for
personal service; and that an action was maintainable by the
plaintiff against the defendants for maliciously procuring such
breaches of contract, and also for maliciously conspiring
together to injure him by preventing persons from entering
into contracts with him. But there seems to be but one case
besides that just decided in England, in which a member of a
trade union who procures the discharge of a non-union workman has been held liable to the latter. This is Lucke v.
Clothing Cutters' & Trimmers' Assembly, No. 7057, 77 Md.
396; S. C., 26 Atl. Rep. 505. In that case the action was
brought by the plaintiff against the whole assembly, by order
of which his employers were notified to discharge him. He
was a faithful, skilful employe, and gave satisfaction to his
employers in every way; but owing to the fact that he was a

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

non-union man, the members of the union objected to his
employment, and, in spite of the fact that he applied for
admission to the union, that body sent to the firm the following
notice, signed by its secretary:
"MESsRS.

ROSENFELD BROS.:

GENTI.EMEN :-Clothing Cutters and Trimmers L. A. 7507,
K. of L., do herewith desire to inform you, that in case the
non-union man whom you have in your employ is any longer
retained, we will be compelled to notify all labor organizations
of the city, that your house is a non-union one."

Upon receiving this notice, the firm immediately notified the
plaintiff that he would have to go, and did in fact discharge
him, at the same time notifying the assembly of their action.
After his discharge the plaintiff had great difficulty in obtaining
work, and when, after some months, he secured another position, it was at a smaller salary than he had received before his
discharge. It was also proved that the natural result of a failure
on the part of his employers to discharge the plaintiff would have
been the withdrawal from them of the patronage of the labor
unions, and the ordering out of the union labor then employed
by them, which would have resulted in great loss. Under these
circumstances, the court held (i.) That the interference of the
union was in law malicious and unquestionably wrongful;
(2.) That the fact that the law authorized the formation of
corporations like the defendant did not confer upon them the
power to demand the discharge of the plaintiff by the means
adopted, the law sanctioning such formation "to promote the
well-being of their every-day life, and for mutual assistance in
securing the most favorable conditions for the labor of their
members and as beneficial societies," (Code Md., Art. 23,
§ 37) which certainly does not mean that that promotion is to
be secured by making war upon the non-union laboring man,
or by any illegal interference with his rights and privileges;
and (3.) That the plaintiff was therefore entitled to recover
from the union the damages sustained by him in consequence
of its actions.
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Tl-e Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas has recently held,
in Barton v. State, 31 S. W. Rep. 671, that when the jury, in
fixing the term of imprisionment, agree that each
verdict,
Impeachment, juror shall write his verdict on a slip of paper,
and that the sum total divided by twelve shall
Average
be the term, a new trial will not be granted, if the term as
fixed varies from the quotient obtained.
This case follows Pndtt v. State, 3o Tex. Cr. Rep. 156; S. C.,
16 S. W. Rep. 773, where the same ruling was made in regard
to a verdict obtained by first dividing the sum of the juror's
opinion as to the length of the term of imprisonment by twelve,
which gave five years and seven months, and then compromising
on five years. In the case in hand the quotient was three years
and ten months, and the term was fixed at four years. But the
mere fact that the quotient obtained is not exactly adopted
does not seem to afford any good reason for making such
cases an exception to the general rule. It is clearly used as a
basis for computation, and being illegal itself ought to vitiate
any calculation made upon it.

